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NOTES

demned, so the defendant condemnee retained no rights in the mineral
2
deposits.
Analagous situations present the important problem of whether the
interest taken by the condemnor is such as to exclude any claim the
condemnee might have to mineral rights. An examination of the nature of title acquired in eminent domain proceedings and its effect upon
disposition of mineral rights, with particular attention to protection
of the condemnee's interests, is the purpose of this note.
Generally speaking, the Federal and State Constitutions contain
clauses to the effect that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."3 Although 'the power of eminent
domain is said to be a power inherent in the sovereign and dependent
upon neither constitution nor statute,4 constitutional clauses like that
referred to are usually considered the basis of the sovereign's right to
exercise eminerit domain. Whether constitution or inherent power
be accepted as the basis of the right of eminent domain, plenary power
to determine when the right may be exercised rests with the legislatures.5 Together with the right to authorize its exercise, the legislatures hold the power (1) to determine the extent of taking which is
reasonably necessary to satisfy the public purpose sought to be served,
and (2) to define the interest or estate which may be taken.0
While the legislatures have plenary power concerning the exercise
of eminent domain, bonstitutional limitations state that the taking
must be for a "public purpose." These limitations theoretically provide an ultimate check upon the discretion of the legislatures.7 The
courts generally construe this constitutional protection to mean that
only such interest may be acquired in condemned property as is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the public purpose involved.8 From this it might seem that in every case there will be a
judicial question of whether the taking is of such nature that it is or
may be founded upon a public necessity. But the courts have been
steadfast in holding that when the legislature has clearly decreed that
a specific interest may be taken, the question of necessity or expedi2

Harn v. State ex rel. Williamson, 184 Okl. 306, 87 P.2d 127 (1939).
See 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 1.3 (3d ed. 1950) for a table of constitutional provisions relative to eminent domain in the various states.
'Burnett v. Central Nebraska Public Power & Irr. Dist., 147 Neb. 458, 23
N.W.2d 661 (1946).
Valentine v. Lamont, 20 N.J. Super. 454, 90 A.2d 143 (1952); Burnett v.
Central Nebraska Public Power &Irr. Dist., 147 Neb. 458, 23 N.W.2d 661 (1946).
1State ex rel. Mitchell v. State Highway Commission, 163 Kan. 187, 182 P.2d
127 (1947); Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282 (1893).
"Lynch v. Forbes, 161 Mass. 302, 37 N.E. 437 (1894); 1 Nichols, Eminent
Domain § 4.11 (3d ed. 1950).

1Whitworth v. Mississippi State Highway Commission, 203 Miss. 94, 33 So.2d

612 (1948); Houck v. Little River Drainage Dist., 343 Mo. 28, 119 S.W.2d 826

(1938).
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ency will be the subject of judicial review only in flagrant cases.9 Indeed, some courts expressly decline to review the necessity or public
purpose involved in the taking.' 0 And even those courts that have frequently declared their power to set aside legislative acts upon grounds
of no public necessity have rarely exercised their vaunted power,
Since broad discretionary power concerning the exercise of eminent
domain rests with the legislatures, the extent of taking authorized in
a given condemnation proceeding will primarily depend upon construction of the statute authorizing and delimiting that particular exercise of power. 12 A clear legislative mandate authorizing the taking
of a fee simple absolutb, which necessarily will contain all lesser estates
including mineral rights,' 3 will be almost invariably upheld by the
courts.
New Jersey held, however, that the legislatures could authorize no
more than the taking of a base fee, limited to the use for which the
property was appropriated. 4 The New Jersey Constitution was
amended in 1947 to allow a fee simple absolute to be taken.", It provides that the condemnor "may be authorized by law to take or otherwise acquire a fee simple absolute or any lesser interest."
In addition to the authorizing statute, the condemnation petition
and procedure will also govern the nature of title acquired by the
condemnor. Under the judicial method, which is used by a great
majoriy of the states and the federal government, the condemnor
acts as plaintiff in the condemnation action. Hence, the nature and
extent of the estate or interest sought to be taken must be clearly set
out in the condemnation petition. 6 Once condemnation becomes final,
the extent of title acquired is limited to the extent of taking described
7
in the condemnation judgment.'
The nature of title acquired by a condemnor will depend, then,
upon (1) the extent of taking authorized by statute, and (2) the extent
of taking recited in the condemnation judgment. It seems clear that
if a statute authorizes and the condemnation judgment decrees the

See note 7 supra.
10

1 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 4.11 (3d ed. 1950).

11
Ibid.
2

" Newton v. Perry, 163 Mass. 319, 39 N.E. 1032 (1895); Burnett v. Central
Nebraska Public Power & Irr. Dist., 147 Neb. 458, 23 N.W.2d 661 (1946).
" Ham v. State ex rel. Williamson, 184 Okl. 306, 87 P.2d 127 (1939); Parish
of Jefferson v. Texas Co., 192 La. 934, 189 So. 580 (1939).
, Summerill v. Hunt, 25 N.J. Misc. 498, 55 A.2d 833 (1947).
1
N.J. Const. Art. IV, § 6.
', Pontiac Improvement Co. v. Board of Commissioners of Cleveland Metropolitan Park District, 104 Ohio 447, 135 N.E. 635 (1922).
" Martin v. City of Bethany, 199 Okl. 57, 182 P.2d 517 (1947); Parish of
Jefferson v. Texas Co., 192 La. 934, 189 So. 580 (1939).
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appropriation of a fee simple absolute, such estate taken includes
minerals lying beneath the surface.1 s
The real problem arises where either the authorizing statute or
condemnation judgment, or both, are silent or ambiguous as to the interest taken. The legislature of Texas has passed a statute which protects the condemnee's right to minerals in such a case. 19 The Texas
statute provides that "except where otherwise expressly provided by
law, the right secured [by the condemnor] . . . shall not be so construed as to include the fee simple estate .... " In other words, where
the mineral rights are disputed after condemnation of land under a
given statute, the statute cannot be construed to authorize taking a fee
simple absolute (and accompanying mineral rights) unless the statute
has expressly authorized such taking.20 In cases where the statute is
ambiguous, effective argument may be advanced by the condemnee
that since the condemnor got something less than a fee simple absolute,
the latter's interest did not include mineral rights.
A Nebraska statute has gone further in reserving mineral rights
than the Texas statute. It provides that in condemnation of state educational land by counties for county fair purposes, "a condemnor cannot acquire any mineral rights in lands taken..."2 1
In absence of such clear legislative mandates conflicting concepts
of construction come into play. In view of the prevailing rule that
only such interest may be acquired as is necessary for the public purpose involved, the courts may be inclined to leave the fee and accompanying mineral rights with the owner. 22 That is, eminent domain statutes will be strictly construed against the condemnor. 23 However, it has been held that in absence of clear statutory authorization,
by virtue of the sovereign's interest the title will be construed to be a
24
fee simple absolute.
Which of the above concepts will be applied in a given case may depend upon the general character of the condemnor, whether it be a
(1) governmental body, its subdivision, or agency, (2) a public service
corporation, or (3) a private enterprise. The courts tend to be more
liberal in favor of the full taking where the condemnor is a govern-

", See note 12 supra.

"Tex. Stat. tit. 52, § 3270 (1952).
"°Dickey's Estate v. Houston Independent School Dist., 300 S.W. 250 (Tex.
Civ.21App. 1927).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 72-223 (Reissue 1950).

-- Hays v. Walnut Creek Oil Co., 75 W.Va. 263, 83 S.E. 900 (1914).
Sheridan County v. Davis, 61 N.D. 744, 240 N.W. 867 (1932); see also 1
Nichols, Eminent Domain § 3.213 (3d ed. 1950) and cases cited therein.
-1Crockett Land & Cattle Co. v. American Toll Bridge Co. of California, 211
Cal. 361, 295 Pac. 328 (1931); Laramie Valley Ry. Co. v. Gradert, 43 Wyo. 268,
3 P.2d 88 (1931).
21
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mental unit.25 To further complicate the situation, courts often differ
in similar cases or even in the same fact situation as to the extent of
taking justified in pursuit of the public purpose involved.
The 1946 Nebraska case of Burnett v. Central Nebraska Public
Power & Irr. Dist., illustrates the point well.26 The condemnor, a public power and irrigation district, appropriated lands of the condemnee
for use in an internal power and irrigation improvement project. Condemnation was authorized concurrently by federal and Nebraska
statutes.27 The Nebraska statute provided that ".. . (the condemnor)
shall have the right to acquire, either by purchAse or condemnation,
all lands and waters and other property necessary for the construction,
use, maintenance, repair, and improvement of any canal, canals, power
plants of any kind or nature, and lands for reservoirs for the storage of
water and all necessary appurtenances." 28 The land was to be used
for the purpose of storing water. Judgment in the condemnation proceeding stated ". . . that the plaintiffs ... have and recover from the
defendant . . . the sum of $53,326.75 in full and complete satisfaction
of any and all damages against said defendant by reason of the defendant's taking and appropriating the lands of the plaintiff's.., for the
uses and purposes as related in the application of the defendant."
Subsequent to condemnation the land was flooded, but during certain intervals the land remained dry long enough for the condemnor to
harvest valuable crops of hay. Condemnee brought declaratory judgment action to have the interest acquired by the condemnor declared
merely an easement, that the condemnee might get damages for the hay
which was harvested and also for any use of the land other than for the
express purpose of the taking. A majority of the Nebraska court held
that (1) the statutes authorized the taking of a fee simple absolute,
(2) the condemnation judgment decreed the taking of a fee simple absolute, (3) the public purpose involved necessitated the taking of a
fee simple absolute, and (4) the condemnee, since he had made no
objection to the extent of taking during the condemnation proceeding,
had no ground for later complaint. The condemnor was granted full
fee title. On the other hand, three dissenting justices decided that
(1) the authorizing statutes were ambiguous as to the interest that
could be taken, (2) the condemnation judgment recited damages for
use of the land and not the taking of a fee simple absolute, (3) the
" Baxter v. City of Louisville, 224 Ky. 604, 6 S.W.2d 1074 (1928); 2 Nichols,

Eminent Domain § 7.5 (3d ed. 1950).
-" Burnett v. Central Nebraska Public Power & Irr. Dist., 147 Neb. 458, 23
N.W.2d 661 (1946).
-"41 Stat. 1074 (1920), 16 U.S.C. § 814 (1946); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 46-125 (Re-

issue 1952); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 70-625, 70-626, 70-627, 70-667, 70-670 (Reissue
1950).
-

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 46-125 (Reissue 1952).
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public use involved did not justify condemnation of a fee simple absolute, and (4) the condemnee should not have been expected to raise
his objections during the condemnation proceeding. The majority and
dissenting opinions were thus in complete disagreement on both the
construction of the statute and the extent of title taken as recited by
the condemnation judgment.
Since a final disposition of mineral rights will depend upon a construction process like that undertaken in Burnett v. Central Nebraska
Public Power & Irr. Dist., it is apparent that the position of the condemnee may be somewhat precarious. If he delays attempt to retain
mineral rights until judgment has been entered and compensation accepted, it may then be too late for him to raise any constitutional objection concerning the extent of taking, as such objections may be
deemed to have been waived..2 9 The only remaining course of action
for the condemnee lies in gaining a construction of the authorizing
statute and condemnation judgment which will result in retention of
mineral rights. But as indicated previously, conflicting rules of statutory construction and different judicial concepts concerning the extent
of taking deemed necessary may make quite doubtful the result of final
disposition of mineral rights.
In view of these uncertainties in title which jeopardize the condemnee's interest in mineral rights, what steps can be taken to protect
his interests? Where the condemnee is able to establish in court the
value of mineral rights and is willing to part with them, no great
problem exists since evidence of value may be submitted and the
court must include such value in its award of compensation. However, frequently the condemnee may have reason to believe that valuable mineral deposits exist under his land, but may anticipate great
difficulty or impossibility of establishing proof of this value. Herein
lies his problem. If the condemnee allows such rights to be taken
from him by condemnation, the award of compensation he will receive
for these rights will be extremely inadequate. Rather than relinquish
what could subsequently prove to be a very valuable interest in his,
land the condemnee should take steps to reserve his mineral rights.
Since direct negotiation for purchase always precedes actual condemnation proceedings, attempt should be made to exclude mineral
rights from the deed of conveyance. Should negotiation fail, a similar
attempt should be made to reserve mineral rights by consent of the
condemnor. If these efforts fail, a more advantageous position from
which to oppose condemnation may be attained by a severance of
Such severance may be
minerals from the remainder of the fee.03
made by conveyance of the mineral interest in the land to another, as
"Mayo v. Windels, 255 App. Div. 22, 5 N.Y.S.2d 690 (1938).
11 Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Goode, 160 Ark. 48, 254 S.W. 345 (1923).

